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INTRODUCTION 
There is a growing interest in the role of leadership in city and regional development – 
burgeoning from business and political science theories of different styles of leadership in 
organizations (NORTHOUSE, 2013; STIMSON et al., 2009; COLLINGE and GIBNEY, 
2010; COLLINGE et al., 2011; SOTARAUTA et al., 2012; BARBER, 2013; BEER and 
CLOWER, 2014; THORKILDSEN, KAULIO and EKMAN, 2015).  BEER and CLOWER 
(2014) stress the decisive role of leadership in realizing regional development ambitions. 
Armed with literature from global institutions, among them the OECD (2009; 2012) and 
MCKINSEY & CO (1994), they place emphasis on the importance of city/regional leadership 
as an enabler of the growth of places. BEER (2014) directs attention to leadership and 
governance in rural areas of Australia, to begin to construct an argument about the 
relationship between the system of governance1 and locally-sensitive modes of place-based 
leadership. His research highlights that in Australia, as in other nations, in order to resist 
central government edict and manage conflict, leaders of place have to negotiate with central 
government so as to be able to shape local policy. As BEER (2014, p. 254) states, ‘this may 
be the only way local residents can influence policy outcomes and, in the longer term, the 
persistence of local leaders may overcome a dominant and controlling centralized state’ 
(emphasis added).  
This observation focuses attention on the role of governance systems at the national scale in 
influencing the scope for leadership of development sub-nationally2 and, particularly, in 
centralized nations, such as the UK (HOC (HOUSE OF COMMONS), 2014). Indeed, as BEER 
(2014, p. 260) notes, ‘leadership at the regional or local scale is a more challenging 
proposition in highly centralized systems of government when compared with nations such as 
the United States where powers are devolved’ (emphasis added). The implication is that in 
more decentralized nations, where powers are devolved to sub-national scales, the scope for 
leadership is greater. This is a moot issue in contemporary UK territorial policy and politics, 
where steps have been taken to devolve bespoke powers, flexibilities and responsibilities to 
selective sub-national governing bodies, in particular, to new growth coalitions 
(ROSENTRAUB and HELMKE, 1996) comprising groupings of local councils (known as 
Combined Authorities) and public-private partnerships (known as Local Enterprise 
Partnerships) (PUGALIS and TOWNSEND, 2014) under the auspices of ‘devolution deals’.  
While BEER (2014, p. 260) analyses the politics of the scope for local leadership through 
empirical work3, he suggests that what is required is a more overt articulation, in conceptual 
terms, of the relationship between national governance systems and leadership at sub-national 
scales. The aim of the paper is to improve existing comprehensions of the mechanisms 
utilized by national government under different systems of governance and how they 
enable/constrain the scope for leadership in sub-national governance bodies. This task is not 
without significant difficulty; the terms of the debate need to be clarified – leadership, 
governance systems and central-local relations – to discern how leadership is facilitated or 
impeded at sub-national scales through the practice of growth coalitions. Ambiguity needs to 
be avoided, in order to help achieve greater analytical precision to enable the specification of 
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the impact of the national system of governance on the scope for leadership of development 
at sub-national scales.  
This paper begins by constructing a triadic conceptualization of leadership, governance 
systems and central-local relations, as a basis for the ensuing deliberation about the influence 
of systems of governance on the scope for place-based leadership. The proposition is that if 
leadership is defined in terms of the power and autonomy to make choices and decisions on 
strategy and action by sub-national bodies to achieve place-based objectives4, it could be 
expected that devolved, decentralized or localist systems of governance, provide greater 
scope for place-sensitive leadership in the development of strategies and action in sub-
national territories. Conversely, it is also contended that centralist systems of governance 
weaken leadership capacity in sub-national terrains (WILSON, 2003; BEER, 2014; GRIGGS 
and SULLIVAN, 2014). Indeed, the concentration of fiscal, regulatory and policy tools in 
centralized systems can inhibit place-based leadership – circumscribing the room to 
manoeuvre. In effect, this can engender a situation where city and regional leaders are 
expected to lead with one or even both hands tied (MARSHALL and FINCH, 2006). 
However, this is not the only means by which a centralized system of governance might limit 
the scope of leadership at sub-national scales. Thus, the question arises of what mechanisms 
does a centralizing government use to exercise control over sub-national governance bodies 
and how do these affect leadership capacity?  
A case study approach involving deductive and inductive methods is deployed to address 
such questions. This represents a grounded theory approach5 in which hypotheses for testing 
may be set but which also aims to ‘generate ideas, concepts and categories, from an analysis 
of data to discern patterns and relationships to derive hypotheses for subsequent testing’ 
(GLASER, 1992). The paper then moves on to recount a policy narrative of the Local 
Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) in England as localist vehicles, which in principle ought to 
engender strong leadership at sub-national scales (LIDDLE, 2012; PUGALIS et.al., 2014). 
Challenging the seductive localist discourse, it is argued that the UK can nonetheless be 
characterized as having a centralist system of government with the effect that that the LEPs 
are subject to unyielding central controls. The case of LEPs, therefore, provide a lens through 
which to identify the mechanisms by which central government exercises control over 
supposedly autonomous, ‘locally owned’ sub-national development structures. Illustrative of 
the intricacies of central-local relations, the case study helps to illuminate the actually 
existing control-enabling mechanisms of the central state. In addition, it is useful in 
elaborating and explicating the dual elements of centralist and localist systems of governance 
as they constrain, enable and/or influence the capacity and practice of leadership by sub-
national bodies.  
The paper invokes the twin concepts of ‘permissibility’ and ‘acceptability’ to enrich the 
analysis. It is contended that central governments that preside over and/or engender an 
overbearing institutional framework of controls, but which represent variable degrees of 
permissibility (consistent with the notion of a democratic state), will enrich and strengthen the 
scope for leadership by sub-national bodies. However, the scope for strong leadership will 
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also be dependent on the acceptability of the degree of the restrictions on decision making on 
strategy and action. If the controls or conditions are not acceptable to the sub-national body, 
this will weaken the power of the leadership to shape strategy and action at the sub-national 
level that address local needs and priorities (i.e. hindering place modes of leadership). 
Simultaneously, the possibility arises that a high degree of permissibility leads to a weakened 
leadership. In part this is due to uncertainty of the scope for leading on strategy and action 
and can result in inaction. 
Findings from the case study suggest that the mechanisms that are constitutive of the capacity 
for leadership at sub-national scales include: the degree of statutory controls; the degree of 
fiscal autonomy; control over finance, budget and resources; and the degree of scrutiny and 
oversight of strategies.  The syncretization of theoretical debates and new conceptual insights 
generated in this paper are anticipated to be of significance to researchers operating in both 
centralized (e.g. New Zealand, Greece and Portugal) and decentralized (e.g. Australia, 
Germany, and Italy) states. 
 
A TRIADIC CONCEPTUALIZATION OF LEADERSHIP, SYSTEMS OF 
GOVERNANCE AND CENTRAL-LOCAL RELATIONS  
 
Spatial terms, such as place and territoriality, according to AGNEW (2013, p. 2) ‘offer a 
profitable theoretical lens through which to analyse the workings of governance and politics’. 
This helps in the construction of a conceptual triad – leadership, systems of governance and 
central-local relations – with which to comprehend the scope for leadership of place-based 
development across sub-national territories under both centralist and localist systems of 
governance.  
 
Place-based development 
 
Recently, attention has shifted to focus and re-focus on ‘place-based’ approaches to city and 
regional development, in part to address critiques of place-blind and traditional regional 
policy approaches (BENTLEY and PUGALIS, 2014; AVDIKOS and CHARDAS, 2016). 
According to some it represents a paradigm shift not only in articulating and comprehending 
urban development dynamics, but also in the form and nature of development strategies 
(BARCA, 2009; OECD, 2011). Place-based narratives have helped to re-affirm that place 
matters and that the development of place is historically contingent (PASSI, 1991; JONES 
and WOODS, 2013; MENDEZ, 2013; PUGALIS and GRAY, 2016).   
 
Readings of place-based development tend to stress the need for what can be described as 
networking and collaborative approaches to governance, given that there is often a 
disjunction between scale geographies of production and consumption and existing territorial 
geographies of governance (BARCA, 2009; HEALEY, 2007; PUGALIS and BENTLEY, 
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2014b). Indeed, the observation that problems extend beyond territorially defined boundaries 
focuses attention on the importance of relational geographies as a means of informing the 
construction of scales of cooperative governance and policy development. These often 
operate in ‘softer’ forms in tandem with ‘harder’ spaces of government (ALLMENDINGER 
and HAUGHTON, 2009; HAUGHTON et al., 2013), where geographies of intervention and 
action are defined through the policymaking process.  
Diverse stakeholder involvement is often a primary aspiration of place-based development 
ideals (BARCA, 2009; PUGALIS and GRAY, 2016; TOMANEY, 2010). Stakeholders who 
are members of leadership structures are drawn from agencies and networks in a wide 
geographical area in a relatively unbounded territory to devise and implement strategies to 
achieve place-based development goals. Governance in this case, refers to a pattern of 
‘horizontal’ governance; that is, it refers to the relationship between sub-national actors. 
Conversely, national-local intergovernmental relations can be referred to as ‘vertical’ 
governance (see figure 1, which diagrammatically illustrates these two spheres).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Horizontal and vertical governance 
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However, it should not be neglected to note that higher level scales of government (e.g. 
national government) can and, often, do participate in horizontal spaces of governance, in 
which case a pattern of multi-level governance6 might be discerned7 (NUGENT, 2003). The 
national scale nonetheless exerts control over sub-national governance structures, but it is 
dialectically related to the national system of governance.  In this sense, ‘the present scalar 
location of a given regulatory process is neither natural nor inevitable’ and, as PECK (2002, p 
340) goes onto argue, it ‘instead reflects an outcome of past political conflicts and 
compromises’. This, in turn, calls for a proactive role for the leadership of governance 
structures in the process of city and regional development. The paper now turns to discuss the 
nature of leadership. 
Leadership  
There is a very extensive literature about leadership in organizations, conceptualised from a 
number of different theoretical bases (NORTHOUSE, 2012, p. 5). But there is no attempt 
made here to provide a comprehensive review of this body of work. Rather, the key concern 
is to analyze the extant conceptual and empirical literature on leadership that either directly 
engages with the notion of place or generates implications for leadership in and of place.  
Leadership is commonly thought of in terms of the ‘individual as leader’. Trait theories, for 
example, suggest that individuals display attributes which propel them to ‘lead’ a group of 
‘followers’ (ZARROCO, 2007). Contrasting theories encompass the view that leaders are not 
born, but rather leadership attributes are developed over timespace and, in addition, that 
leadership can be learned but, moreover, that it is situational (BLANCHARD, et al., 1993). 
Beyond distinctions between ‘leader(s)’ and ‘leadership’, the above theories of leadership 
allude to the contextual complexities of leadership. Thus, some work has placed emphasis on 
evaluating the behaviour of effective leaders, in order to define a set of behaviours that 
signify effective leadership (HERSEY et al., 2008).  
Leadership, however, has also been defined as a process whereby ‘an individual influences a 
group of individuals to achieve a common goal’ (NORTHOUSE, 2012, p. 5). Leadership can 
be emergent, where authority is assumed or afforded within the group to an individual but 
also to a set of individuals8. Leadership such as this, rather than being transactional, is 
transformational since leaders are charged with identifying the need for change, creating a 
vision to guide the change through inspiration, and executing the change in tandem with 
committed members of the group (BURNS, 1978). A further tenet of leadership is that it 
involves taking responsibility for making choices and ultimately decisions, which are 
subsequently enacted. Such propositions are particularly relevant to the consideration of 
leadership in city and regional development (COLLINGE and GIBNEY, 2010; COLLINGE 
et al., 2011; GIBNEY, 2014; LIDDLE, 2012; see BEER and CLOWER, 2014 for a 
comprehensive review).   
BEER (2014) contends that that leadership matters to place-based development – a vital 
component of tailoring policies to the specificities of place. In particular, place-based 
leadership is considered to improve the capacity to generate future-oriented spatial visions as 
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well as increasing the likelihood of realizing visions. It could also be argued that the 
leadership of cities and regions is much more complex and opaque than in linear 
organizations, such as corporations or governments, as it is a constellation of interests and 
reciprocal relations sensitive to the vagaries of ‘mutual trust’. Thus, while leadership is 
commonly defined in terms of ‘a process of social influence in which one person can enlist 
the aid and support of others in the accomplishment of a common task’ (ROBINSON, 2009, 
p.1, emphasis added) leadership can also refer to the exercise of leadership by a collective. 
STIMSON et al. (2002) concur with this reading of leadership by recognizing the importance 
of ‘collective relationships’ alongside more traditional ‘hierarchical relationships’.  Collective 
forms of leadership would, therefore, appear to be in accordance with notions of collaborative 
governance (ANSELL and GASH, 2008). Yet, there are some important conceptual, 
analytical and practice differences that require collaboration – an issue also raised by 
SOTARAUTA (2014) and BEER (2014).  
SOTARAUTA (2014, p. 28) recognises the connection between leadership and local/regional 
development but considers the link between leadership and governance as something of a 
‘black box’. He contends, given that ‘collaboration emerges in many studies as being crucial 
in place-based leadership … leadership ought not to be defined through it’ (SOTARAUTA, 
2014, p. 29). Sotarauta’s suggestion is to replace the notion of ‘leadership’ with that of 
‘partnership’, whereby ‘governance’ would be defined in relation to partnership: ‘[i]f we 
defined partnership as “the tendency of the community to collaborate” and governance by 
saying that “it will not be based on traditional hierarchical relationships”, this would make a 
lot of sense’ (SOTARAUTA, 2014, p. 29).  
An alternative proposition is to apply the term governance to the process of dialogue in 
formulating strategies, discussing actions to be undertaken by actors9 who are not necessarily 
or likely to be making decisions. Given that place-based modes of development emphasize 
shared responsibilities and multi-actor working relationships or, in other words, collaborative 
governance, according to SOTARAUTA (2014), it is less circumscribed by hierarchical 
relationships10 (although such theorizations are often less discernable in practice). In this 
sense, collaborative governance applies to the pattern of horizontal governance, as noted 
above, and is similar to what SOTARAUTA (2014) refers to as partnership. Therefore, 
collaborative governance can be taken to refer to the process of dialogue over devising 
strategies, and identifying, overseeing and implementing activities. This involves various 
tasks including ascertaining the perceived interventions required, producing visions, 
exploring policy options, securing development finance and mobilizing resources.  
Based on this reading, leadership could be (re)conceptualised as the capacity of the coming 
together of actors to realize (collaborative governance) ambitions. Hence, leadership refers to 
the collective power of actors to make decisions on strategy and execute actions. HORLINGS 
(2010) concurs, in theorizing leadership as a multi-tiered activity that has the aim of creating 
the ‘capacity to act’.  SOTARAUTA et al. (2012, p.5, emphasis added) reaffirm such a 
perspective, stating that ‘leaders are people who have the potential to organize and reorganize 
social action with an ambition to change the institutions in which the factors that affect 
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sustainable regional development are embedded’. The last point concerning embeddedness is 
crucial to understandings of place-based leadership as it recognises that actors have spatial 
being – they are not necessarily rooted in one particular place, but nevertheless are always in 
place (CASEY, 1993). 
Accordingly, given the role of actors in leading on decision-taking, the question arises of who 
makes the decisions: an individual (a leader) or a collective (leaders). It is clear that decisions 
could be taken by a leader and, in the case of city and regional development, by a particular 
type of leader, such as elected mayors invested with democratic leadership credentials. The 
growing literature about the decision-making power of city/metro mayors often draws 
attention to trait and behavioural theories of these ‘charismatic’ individuals; see for example 
cases from New York, Barcelona and London (BARBER, 2013; GASH and SIMS, 2012).  
Yet, this heroic type of leader is often one of many leaders (i.e. enmeshed in a heterogeneous 
constellation of leaders), whereby decisions are informed by and executed by a range of 
actors engaged in the process of collaborative governance of city and regional development. 
In this sense, pivotal leadership figures are often the ‘front’ for more complex forms and 
patterns of leadership behind the scenes. Thus, it can be argued that city and regional 
development leadership is exercised by individuals via a process of collaborative governance. 
This recognises that a group of actors is involved in the design and delivery, or ‘co-
production’, of place-based development strategies. Hence, leadership is exercised through 
the governance process, which involves both individual and collective patterns of leadership.  
Systems of Governance 
Critical to the power and autonomy of leadership at sub-national scales is the degree of 
centralization and the mechanisms that the central state utilizes to control/manage sub-
national governance structures. Conversely, decentralization and/or devolution imply a 
greater degree of autonomy for sub-national governance structures (PRATCHETT, 2004; 
TSUKAMOTO, 2012). Therefore, ability of sub-national bodies to take decisions on strategy 
and effect action is affected by the degree of autonomy of the governance structure at the sub-
national level vis-à-vis central government. BEER (2014, p. 254), in raising the point that the 
system of governance at the national scale matters to place-based leadership, comments that 
centralized systems of government generate weaker patterns of  leadership pursued by sub-
national bodies. Conversely, it could be inferred that there exists capacity for strong place-
based leadership in localist systems of governance. Thus, what might be characterized as the 
system of governance – on a continuum from centralism to localism – is a determining factor 
of the scope for place-based leadership of sub-national bodies. It could be conceptualized that 
there is weak leadership at sub-national level under centralized systems of governance and 
scope for stronger leadership under localist systems of governance. However, such 
relationships are not simply linear. For example, it is possible that strong place-based 
leadership can exist under centralizing systems of governance. Table 1 illustrates the 
possibilities for the capacity of place-based leadership in governance structures in sub-
national territories under centralizing and localizing systems of governance.    
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Table 1. Strength of Local Leadership by System of Governance 
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New Centralism: 
Controls (a targetry 
regime) which provides 
the sub-national level 
with a framework for 
decisions on strategy and 
action in relation to local 
development.  
Devolution: 
(Localism)  
All powers and resources 
devolved to the local level; 
Sub-national level can make 
decisions on strategy and 
action in relation to local 
development  
 
S
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f 
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Weak 
 
 
Centralism: 
Sub-national level to 
administer and discharge 
nationally devised policy 
programmes and political 
projects. Cannot make 
own decisions on 
strategy and action in 
relation to local 
development. 
 
Decentralization: 
(Conditional localism) 
Some powers and resources 
given to the local level; Sub-
national level can make 
some of the decisions on 
strategy and action that it 
wants to take on sub-
national development but 
this is conditional on 
delivering outcomes centre 
requires.  
  Centralist Localist 
  System of Governance 
 
As the conceptual schemata represented in table 1 indicates, leadership capacity is theorized 
to be strongest where powers and resources are devolved to sub-national governance 
structures, a characteristic of federal states, for example. HILDRETH (2011) terms this 
‘representative localism’, illustrated by sub-national actors or spaces of governance having a 
clear constitutional position in a democratic system. What could be termed ‘representative 
leadership’ is reflected in some European and US experience, where directly or indirectly 
elected mayors are perceived to offer enhanced scope for transparency, advocacy and 
strategic capacity (TRAVERS, 2002).  For PRATCHETT (2004), localism invokes the notion 
of freedom from interference by central government, this providing scope for styles of 
leadership to emerge across sub-national scales, which reflect the particularities of place, 
whilst enabling strong leadership to address sub-national development priorities. 
Commensurately, it is possible that localist systems of governance also engender weak 
leadership capacity or, in other words, ‘conditional localism’11. The concept implies some 
scope for the exercise of leadership at sub-national scales since the central authority 
decentralizes power, subject to particular conditionalities. Power to make decisions and take 
action is conditional; it is dependent on the local level supporting the policy objectives and 
delivering outcomes the centre requires (HILDRETH, 2011, p. 704).  
Centralism implies that sub-national scales of governance operate within particular strictures 
as specified by central government. Within such systems of governance, it is typical for sub-
national development bodies to administer and discharge nationally-devised policy-
programmes and political projects. This tends to be characterized by more muted forms of 
place-based leadership at sub-national scales (WALKER, 2004). In England, Regional 
Forthcoming in Regional Studies 
10 
 
 
Development Agencies faced criticism in this respect (PEARCE and AYRES, 2009). It is 
possible nonetheless that place-based leadership can flourish in centralized systems of 
governance. CORRY AND STOKER (2002) posit a ‘New Centralism’12 which they typify as 
a ‘steering centralism’. While it involves what they perceive as a debilitating ‘targetry 
regime’, it affords some autonomy at sub-national scales. The same point can be made in 
relation to EU Structural Funds which are criticized for the conditionalities imposed by an 
inflexible target and monitoring regime (DĄBROWSKI, 2011). An alternative perspective is 
that of ‘steering’ from higher levels of government which provides a consistent framework 
for sub-national constellations of actors.  This would appear to be particularly attractive when 
such sub-national development structures are bereft of a statutory personality and a clear 
legal basis. Enhanced ‘policy coherence’ from centre to local level, is one of the primary 
rationales for central steering.  
BEER and CLOWER (2014) point out that the eclectic interests of the regional development 
community has generally eschewed normative questions on the role of agency in studies of 
local/regional development and, as SOTARAUTA (2014, p. 29) asserts, this has left the 
discussion of the concept of power to be addressed by sister disciplines, such as political 
science. However, related to the notion of leader/leadership in city and regional development, 
the question can be asked of how the power to lead and make decisions at sub-national level 
is derived to enable leadership. As captured by the notion of the pattern of vertical 
governance, it is encompassed by the introduction of the concept of intergovernmental 
relations (RHODES, 2003; CORRY and STOKER, 2002; MORPHET, 2007).  
Central-Local Relations   
Systems of governance at sub-national scales, defined in terms of horizontal power relations 
particularly as it applies to cities, help in the understanding of central-local relations 
(HLEPAS and HEINELT, 2006). Regime theory, arguably synonymous with the concept of 
collaborative governance referred to above, recognizes the complexities of forming 
governing coalitions between diverse societal actors, including private interests (STONE, 
1989). STONE (1989, p 3) argues that regimes ‘have access to institutional resources; they 
are the most powerful people who come together to solve public problems; and they have 
more power together than if they tried to govern alone’. The concept of ‘growth coalition’ 
(JOHN, 2001) which is more apt here, refers to the role of power elites in co-ordinating 
action to propel the economic ‘growth machine’ (MOLOTCH, 1976), whereas regimes often 
concern a broader array of policy areas, such as, education and transport.  
MOURITZEN and SVARA (2002) posit different forms of local government leadership, 
defined in terms of different types of political leadership which relate to the extent to which 
there is a majority political power and the extent to which politicians control the executive: a 
strong mayoral form; a committee-leader form; a collective form and a council-manager 
form. The latter represents the case where power is concentrated in the hands of the executive 
rather than the politicians. Each of these distinct forms of local government leadership can 
influence the nature of central-local relations. For example, it is often implied that a visible 
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mayor with executive powers is able to negotiate a high degree of access to ministers, 
whereas a council-manager may be anticipated to generate more traction with central 
government departments. 
BEVIR (2012) draws attention to centre-local relations, the political and administrative 
relationships that exist between a central state and the sub-national governments within its 
territorial borders. This relationship is contingent and reflective of the allocation and overlap 
of functions and duties, the degree of discretion in terms of fiscal, statutory and policy 
responsibilities, and institutional relationships (PAGE and GOLDSMITH, 1987). Bringing in 
an international dimension they argue that local governments in countries in Northern Europe 
are allocated a high number of functions, a high level of discretion to discharge their 
responsibilities and a low level of access to national level, this because they do not need to 
lobby central government.  However, as SELLERS and LIDSTRÖM (2007) argue this is not 
the case; power is mediated. In a discussion about the reconciliation of national and local 
roles in an egalitarian welfare state they suggest that ‘local government would be given 
administrative and fiscal capacities to implement policies… national government would 
employ legal mandates, administrative supervision and fiscal incentives to control this pursuit 
from above’ (SELLERS and LIDSTRÖM, 2007, p 612).   
In this respect, PIERRE (2000) emphasises that the resolution of complex public problems in 
variable spatial contexts requires sophisticated policy co-ordination. RHODES (1997, p15) 
considers that to achieve this requires ‘self-organizing, interorganizational networks 
characterized by interdependence… and significant autonomy from the state’ (emphasis 
added). This raises other considerations about the nature of that autonomy.  
Permissibility and Acceptability 
Deploying the dual concepts of ‘permissibility’ and ‘acceptability’ provides an analytical 
device for deciphering the actually existing nature of place-based leadership. It can be posited 
that new centralism signals the practical application of the concept of acceptability; that is, 
the case where the control mechanisms by which the central authority specifies what actions 
sub-national bodies can take are acceptable13 to the sub-national governance structure. In 
terms of a targetry regime, such targets help to construct an operating framework and, thus, 
an enhanced degree of certainty for sub-national governance structures; providing a 
framework within which sub-national leadership can take decisions on strategy and action. It 
proffers the scope for strong leadership or autonomy in relation to place-based development. 
Conditional localism evokes the concept of permissibility. Whilst responsibilities and 
functions are decentralized (which may be consistent with central government priorities), 
they offer some scope for freedom of action (subject to precise conditionalities). Thus, while 
actions are permissible, they are dependent on the sub-national authorities acceding to 
national government steering or meta-governance (JESSOP, 2004). If the sub-national body 
consider the central (government) operating framework to be unacceptable, then it could be 
reasoned that the capacity for leadership will be weakened.14 In addition, the possibility arises 
that a high degree of permissibility leads to weakened leadership. This is because, uncertain 
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of the scope for leading on strategy and action, inaction takes hold resulting in inertia. The 
scope for leadership by sub-national governance structures can be enhanced or curbed, 
depending on the acceptability of central government controls. The paper turns to the 
investigation of the case of the English LEPs, to discern the control/enabling mechanisms that 
might be utilized by a central government. 
 
 
A NARRATIVE ON SYSTEMS OF GOVERNANCE  
AND SUB-NATIONAL LEADERSHIP OF PLACE-BASED DEVELOPMENT:  
THE CASE OF THE ENGLISH LEPS 
Having mapped out the conceptual terrain derived from a cross-disciplinary review of key 
literature pertaining to place-based development, leadership, governance systems and central-
local relations , this section utilises ‘the force of example’ (FLYVBERG, 2006) of LEPs to 
enhance existing comprehensions of the scope for place-based leadership across sub-national 
territories. The triadic conceptualisation of leadership, systems of governance and central-
local relationships provides a framework for the investigation of the actually existing control-
enabling mechanisms utilized by central government to steer the contours of place-based 
leadership performed by sub-national bodies. By so doing, the implications for the strength of 
leadership can be discerned.  
 
The emergence of LEPs: New sub-national governance structures 
The territorial scales of sub-national governance in England have undergone significant 
change since the Coalition Government took office in 2010. This has been analysed in detail 
elsewhere (e.g. AYRES and STAFFORD, 2014; HENDERSON, 2015) so will not be 
recounted here. LEPs are voluntary ‘[j]oint local authority-business bodies brought forward 
by local authorities themselves to promote local economic development’ (HM 
GOVERNMENT, 2010, p. 10), typically involving two or more contiguous principal local 
authorities (BENTLEY et al, 2010). Indeed, dual LEP membership of some local authorities 
has produced overlapping LEP geographies, as central government originally set the 
conditionality that LEP geographies ought to align with the theoretical principles of 
functional economic areas (PUGALIS and TOWNSEND, 2014).  
The original ambit of LEPs, whilst intended to be permissive to place-based characteristics, 
was that these non-statutory entities should mobilise the capabilities of business and local 
government, in particular, but also other actors such as universities, to provide strategic 
economic leadership. For example, central government documents state that the core role of 
LEPs is to ‘provide the clear vision and strategic leadership to drive sustainable private 
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sector-led growth and job creation in their area’ (HM GOVERNMENT, 2010, p.13). Primary 
fields of competence were to include planning, housing, and employment and enterprise. In 
this sense, LEPs can be viewed as place-based development bodies that perform pivotal roles 
in intergovernmental and cross-sector relations concerned with city and regional development 
(PUGALIS and TOWNSEND, 2013). They are spatial coalitions of diverse actors with a 
shared interest in pursuing growth (PUGALIS and TOWNSEND, 2014). Hence, they can be 
referred to as growth coalitions.  
 
Leadership of LEPs 
Central government discourse appealed to ‘local ownership of action’, whereby solutions 
were encouraged to be ‘locally tailored’ or place-specific. A ministerial letter (CABLE and 
PICKLES, 2010) set out in succinct terms central government’s preference for LEPs to be led 
by an individual from the private sector (i.e. an entrepreneur or business executive as 
chairperson). A central narrative guiding the formation of LEPs was the need for these new 
bodies to be entrepreneurial – injecting commercial acumen, financial expertise and 
business/corporate leadership, deemed to be absent in recent institutional antecedents, such as 
Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) (PUGALIS and BENTLEY, 2014a). Central 
government placed a premium on the recruitment of ‘business leaders’, through statements 
making reference to ‘titans of industry’. Yet, ‘business leadership’ was largely neglected. 
Criteria, issued by central government, expected at least half of LEP board members to be 
comprised of business ‘leaders’ with local authority ‘leaders’ also to be represented on the 
board.15. Other governing actors, such as university vice chancellors or social housing 
executives, were optional – subject to place-based preferences. Although marginal, there are 
a few cases where third sector organizations are board members of LEPs (HM 
GOVERNMENT, 2010, p.15) and over the first five years of LEPs their board compositions 
have evolved to reflect an expanding scope. The voluntaristic nature of LEPs, however, 
notwithstanding that many have since been established as limited companies, indicate that 
LEPs were to embody the principles of collaborative governance from which (a combination 
of business and democratic local political) leadership emerges.  
Several distinct modes of leadership emerge across the landscape of LEPs. Some, such as 
those with a local government-based secretariat for example, are dominated by public sector 
interests. Others display a more powerful role for private sector actors or business 
organizations. Most LEPs have established one or more ‘leadership boards’ and ‘leadership 
teams’. In some cases, leadership teams are dominated by executive staff whereas leadership 
boards are typically the preserve of board members. In many LEP areas, local politicians 
have often set-up ‘local authority leadership boards’, many of which meet prior to LEP board 
meetings. Formalizing horizontal collaboration between groupings of local authorities is also 
in the ascendency; witnessed through the rising number of Combined Authorities since the 
first one was established in Greater Manchester in 2011.  
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The plethora of boards, sub-groups and area-panels ensues that many LEPs operate according 
to a hierarchical decision-making structure. Nevertheless, as powers, resources and capacity 
are distributed across a multi-institutional environment, leadership tends to be a collective 
endeavour. For example, the majority of LEPs have assigned particular individuals to lead 
specific groups and priorities, and similarly most LEPs have appointed a lead local authority 
for a particular policy field, such as transport or skills. Yet, significantly, the process of 
leadership entails transformational acts involving dispersed actors. 
 
Governance System 
The government narrative surrounding the institutionalizing of LEPs emphasized ‘freeing’ 
places from centralist control; contrasting the flexible framework informing the work of LEPs 
with the bureaucratic operating environment of RDAs, which were deemed to be creatures of 
central government. Prior to their abolition in 2012, the role and function of the RDAs was 
prescribed in legislation, and they were subject to an onerous targetry regime, characteristic 
of a ‘New Centralist’ system of governance. In contrast LEPs, which are voluntary 
organizations – many of which possess no legal personality (as of December 2015) – were 
not conferred any statutory functions (BENTLEY et al, 2010). Ministers proclaimed that the 
absence of a statutory framework would provide LEPs with the freedom to act and keep them 
‘free’ from bureaucratic practices; ostensibly reflecting a localist agenda. 
It could be expected that the scope for leadership under a localist system of governance 
would be strong; that the LEP leadership would have considerable autonomy in decision 
making power to determine strategy and actions to address sub-national development 
priorities. Nevertheless, the narrative of local freedoms was significantly negated by the less 
publicized, but decisively important, acts of recentralization. Matters relating to trade and 
investment, innovation, venture capital, sector support and business support were passed from 
the RDAs to be managed mainly by the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills and its 
subsidiary organisations or Quangos (HILDRETH and BAILEY, 2013).  
 
Control/Enabling Mechanisms of Central Government and the implications for Leadership 
Capacity 
Crucial to the question of the extent to which a LEP could exercise place-based leadership 
concerns the control mechanisms of central government. Table 2 distils the results of research 
on the primary mechanisms that central government has utilised to constrain or enable the 
leadership capacity of these sub-national development governance structures and how they 
mediate the scope for leadership at sub-national scales.  
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Table 2. Mechanisms utilised by Central Government to Constrain/Enable sub-national governance 
structures and the implications for Leadership Capacity 
Enabling/ 
constraining 
mechanisms 
Examples Conceptual insights: Mode of 
governance and implications for 
strength of leadership  
Commentary 
Legislation  
Whether statutory 
obligations are 
placed on sub-
national 
institutions via 
Statute Law. 
LEPs are voluntary 
constellations of actors, 
devoid of a statutory 
personality. The Localism 
Act 2011 does not confer 
LEPs with any statutory 
functions. The Act confers 
a General Power of 
Competence on Local 
Authorities. 
 
 
 
 
By way of neglecting to provide LEPs 
with a statutory basis the Act in effect 
in theory provided LEPs with 
‘unlimited’ scope for action, thus 
reflecting a Localism. Would enhance 
leadership capacity but, at the same 
time, this permissiveness means 
curtailment of leadership due to there 
being no statutory footing for action, 
which could lead to inaction. 
 
LEPs were unclear about their raison 
d'etre. The theoretical open-
endedness of the scope for action led 
to confusion about the core purpose 
of these sub-national entities. 
Subsequently weakening their 
leadership capacity. 
The principle of permissibility opens-up 
greater possibilities for leadership to 
develop and implement policies tailored 
to the specificities of the problems 
faced in sub-national terrains. However, 
LEPs are reliant on the statutory 
functions of Local Authorities; a 
nominated Local Authority has to 
perform the ‘accountable body’ 
function. 
 
LEP Chairs repeatedly asked ministers 
for clarity and guidance on the role of 
LEPs. Eric Pickles, Minister for 
Communities and Local Government, 
was reported as stating, ‘keep on doing 
what you want to do, until you are 
stopped’.  
 
 The Local Democracy, 
Economic Development 
and Construction Act 
2009 provides ministers 
with the power to transfer 
local public functions 
from the centre to 
permitted authorities that 
either (i) promote 
economic development or 
wealth creation or (ii) 
increase local 
accountability in relation 
to each local public 
function transferred. 
 
Subject to ministerial discretion, it 
proposed that some national functions 
be devolved to particular sub-national 
terrains, which offer the scope to 
enhance leadership capacity. This 
reflects a localist system of 
governance. It could represent 
devolution or it may only extend to a 
conditional localism; restrictions 
might be imposed on precisely what 
powers the sub-national level is 
granted. This step is subject to the 
acceptability to the sub-national level 
of the restrictions on the scope for 
decision making on strategy and 
action. 
 
The Devolution Deals are resulting in 
different functions being devolved to 
different Combined Authorities.  Is 
asymmetric devolution of functions and 
comes with ‘strings attached’. 
 
A ‘Devolution Deal’ for Sheffield City 
Region resulted in enterprise funding 
being devolved. Many Wave 1 City 
Deal agreements resulted in similar 
transfers of public functions from the 
centre to either a single Local Authority 
or groupings of Local Authorities. 
 
 
Resources: Fiscal 
Autonomy/ 
Control over  
budget 
 
Local Tax: Local 
Authorities in England 
have tax raising powers. 
However, on average 63% 
of total local government 
income in 2012-13 was in 
the form of government 
grants. Council Tax made 
up only 17% of local 
government income.  
Not fiscal devolution; weakens scope 
for leadership. 
If the power to raise the tax base and 
utilize income were given, this could 
be anticipated to enhance the 
leadership capacity of sub-national 
governance structures. 
The degree of local/sub-national 
revenue generation varies considerably. 
For example, Gisela Stewart, MP for 
Birmingham, Edgbaston, has stated that 
Birmingham City Council raises only 
8% of its revenue via local taxes 
(Council Tax); the balance of revenue 
comes via central government. 
 Tax Increment Financing: 
enables Local Authorities 
to borrow against future 
projected business rates 
uplift and thus fund 
projects (especially up-
front ‘sunk costs’ such as 
infrastructure). 
 
  
 
Tax Increment Financing, while a 
measure of decentralization, is 
conditional localism and could 
weaken leadership. This is because, 
through its deployment, Local 
Authorities have to accede to the 
government’s growth agenda. Has 
potential to strengthen leadership 
capacity, is dependent on the 
acceptability of growth agenda 
priorities as well as associated risks. 
Tax Increment Financing models are 
being used by a variety of Local 
Authorities and sub-national entities, 
such as in Newcastle-Gateshead. The 
financial model assumes that the 
revenue generated from business rates 
uplift will be enough to repay the initial 
financial outlay (in the form of a loan). 
Therefore, as has transpired in North 
America, the risk is devolved to Local 
Authorities. 
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Funding Regional Growth Fund; 
Growing Places Fund 
 
An award of grant is not fiscal 
devolution. Grant reflects central 
government priorities, represents 
centralist behaviour. 
 
 
RGF was made available to private 
enterprises; Growing Places Fund to 
LEPs to overcome constraints on 
infrastructure investments. 
 
 Single Local Growth 
Fund: This multi-annual 
central government fund is 
dispersed to each of the 39 
LEPs. Involves making a 
‘Growth Deal’ with 
Central Government.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The ‘Growth Deals’ negotiated 
between central government and the 
LEPs offered potential for sub-
national governance and leadership 
teams to secure additional ‘freedoms’, 
responsibilities and flexibilities than 
hitherto, but was in return for 
agreeing to central government 
stipulations (e.g. growth targets). Is 
New Centralism. But, provided the 
targets are acceptable to the LEPs, 
obtaining the freedoms would 
strengthen the power of the sub-
national leadership. 
 
 
 
The notion of enhanced ‘flexibilities’ 
(which can also represent 
decentralization - a Conditional 
Localism) suggests there is a degree 
of permissibility in what sub-national 
authorities can do. Could strengthen 
place-based leadership capacity. The 
ability to exercise enhanced 
flexibilities may ultimately depend on 
the acceptability of new 
conditionalities, which could weaken 
place-based leadership capacity. 
 
 
Sub-national stakeholders involved in 
the first round of Growth Deal 
negotiations with central government 
bemoaned the ‘hidden agenda’ and 
‘unwritten rules’ that only became 
apparent during the process.  
 
Several LEPs, for example, reported 
that civil servants strongly encouraged 
the LEP to ‘revise up’ their funding 
request. Consequently, this involved the 
LEP engaging with partners to work-up 
their proposals by adding 
projects/programmes and all the 
associated supporting evidence required 
to justify these schemes.  
 
The final decision on the Deals resulted 
in the LEPs receiving funds that were 
almost identical to LEPs’ original 
submissions. Interviewees suggested 
that this not only ‘wasted a lot of time 
and effort’, but also, and potentially 
more significant, exhausted the 
goodwill of key delivery partners. 
Governmental 
Guidance 
 
 
Formal policy and 
guidance was issued by 
central government 
including via the Local 
Growth White Paper and 
ministerial letters. Less 
formal guidance includes 
ministerial public 
statements or articles. 
Strategic Economic Plans which set 
out strategic priorities for each 
locality had to be produced by each of 
the 39 LEPs. But was at the request of 
central government. These formed an 
important element of Growth Deal 
negotiations (see above). Plans were 
assessed and had to be approved by 
central government. Decentralization, 
and a Conditional Localism.  
 
The relatively sparse nature of official 
central government policy and 
guidance provided an appearance of 
permissibility. This indicates scope 
for enhanced place-based leadership; 
it appeared to allow authorities to do 
what they wanted. However, 
‘unwritten rules’ emerged through 
less formal channels and softer spaces 
of state, which helped to clarify the 
acceptability of the rules from the 
perspective of local government and 
the LEPs. Is a Conditional Localism. 
This would affect leadership capacity 
since guidance could limit the LEPs 
scope for action.  
 
LEPs have often had to ‘learn the game, 
as [they] play it’ – often reacting to 
ministerial pronouncements or steering 
from civil servants. This appears to 
have negated the opportunities to 
perform place-based leadership. 
 
 
 
 
 
Prior to central government approval of 
LEPs, some emergent sub-national 
development entities made proposals 
that identified a Local Authority elected 
leader as the LEP chair. Such proposals 
were dismissed by central government.  
 
Even though central government 
policy-guidance was sparse it 
nevertheless provided a centralist steer, 
especially in terms of the leadership of 
LEPs ie a chair had to be from the 
private sector. 
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The findings indicate that Central government displays different types of governance 
behaviours. Sub-national governance structures thus have to contend with a mix of 
constraining and enabling mechanisms, representing different degrees of permissibility, 
which strengthen and/or weaken leadership capacity. The case of LEPs reveals that these 
voluntaristic entities have negotiated some autonomy of action although, through the meta-
governance and conditionalities imposed, the UK Government retained a high level of 
centralist controls. SELLERS and LIDSTRÖM (2007), as noted above, identify legal 
mandates, administrative supervision and fiscal incentives as the mechanisms by which the 
centre controls sub-national leadership capacity. However, in referring to fiscal aspects of 
control, SELLERS and LIDSTRÖM do not differentiate between the award of grant by 
central government and tax raising powers at the sub-national scale. In addition, 
administrative supervision is defined in terms of the oversight of the activities of sub-national 
authorities by central government officials.  In the mining of secondary sources of 
information in the inductive approach taken in the research for this paper, four key 
mechanisms of control were discerned:  Legislation and formal agreements; the extent of 
fiscal autonomy; Funding; and Government Guidance. The latter relates to the extent to 
which strategies can address either local or national priorities. These are discussed in turn in 
more detail.  
1. Legislation and formal agreements – Legislation prescribes the statutory functions and the 
scope for action by governments. In regard to legislation, the Localism Act 2011 relating 
to the establishment of the LEPs was devoid of any mention of statutory functions for the 
LEPs. The absence of a statutory framework augmented the policy narrative that LEPs 
were ‘free’ to pursue place-based development objectives. This represents a high degree 
of permissiveness; however, it led to some confusion within LEPs about their raison 
d'être. Derived from a history of sub-national development bodies under the close overt 
direction central government, many LEPs were like rabbits caught in the headlights of a 
permissive policy apparatus, where there was little written guidance or requirements 
forthcoming from government. The lack of a statutory framework and little guidance 
engendered uncertainty within LEPs about the policy actions they could undertake. This, 
it can be argued, weakens leadership capacity. Whilst seeming to have power to take 
decisions and to implement strategy and action, the power given by such a high degree of 
permissibility to do so is not exercised. 
 
2. Fiscal autonomy – Fiscal autonomy is a vital concomitant element to the devolution of 
functions to sub-national bodies. As table 2 indicates, however, while local authorities 
have tax raising powers, only up to 17% of local government income in the UK is raised 
in this way.  If the power to raise the tax base and utilize income were afforded, this could 
be anticipated to enhance the leadership capacity of sub-national governance structures. 
Recent changes to the tax system in the UK in 2015 permit local authorities to retain local 
business rates to reinvest in local priorities. Tax Increment Financing enables local 
authorities to borrow against future projected business rates uplift to fund projects.  Such 
a power to act however is little more than conditional localism (HILDRETH, 2011). This 
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is because, through its deployment, local authorities have to accede to the government’s 
growth agenda. The negotiation of devolution deals between central government and 
groupings of local authorities (often involving Combined Authorities and LEPs) are also 
susceptible to central government’s growth agenda demands, whereby additional risks as 
well as responsibilities are transferred via devolution deal-making processes. PECK 
(2012) refers to this as a push form of austerity politics in the sense that cuts are pushed 
down to sub-national bodies in a manner that is not commensurate with the additional 
policy responsibilities that are simultaneously transferred.  
 
3. Funding – With most of local government revenue being in the form of government 
grants, and little revenue being generated through tax raising powers, these cannot be said 
to constitute fiscal devolution. However, the scale of funding in the form of grants that is 
made available to sub-national authorities shapes the scope for leadership. Grants are 
made available to the LEPs and local government for different uses. At the time of their 
inception, LEPs were allocated a nominal budget, although funding has since 
dramatically increased through the establishment of the Local Growth Fund (HM 
GOVERNMENT, 2013). This and other funding streams for city and regional 
development projects have primarily been issued on a competitive basis. The multi-
annual Local Growth Fund is linked to each LEP negotiating a ‘growth deal’ with central 
government. In essence, this ‘growth pact’ offers the potential for sub-national 
governance and leadership teams to secure additional ‘freedoms’, responsibilities and 
flexibilities, and so enhance the scope for strong leadership. However, these deals are 
subject to central government conditionalities, such as achieving particular growth targets 
as well as other growth objectives. This represents a ‘New Centralism’ mode of 
behaviour. Indeed, the restrictions, caveats and conditions attached to specific funding 
streams comprising the ‘Single’ Local Growth Fund reduce the scope of sub-national 
leadership bodies to pursue place-based priorities. However, it can be argued that 
provided the targets are acceptable, obtaining the freedoms this would bring would 
strengthen the power of the sub-national leadership. 
 
4. Government Guidance – Beyond funding conditionalities, some subtle forms of central 
control mechanisms are also operating. For example, as part of growth deal exercises, 
LEPs were required to prepare Strategic Economic Plans (SEPs) – intended to provide the 
bases for growth deal negotiations.  Draft plans had to be submitted to government as 
well as the final document; both were subject to government approval. Whilst official 
government guidance was ‘light touch’, behind the scenes government prescription was 
fierce. In some instances, LEPs were instructed to omit detail relating to their longer-term 
spatial priorities (beyond a narrow pursuit of economic growth) and, instead, focus on the 
short-term funding priorities of government departments contributing to the Local 
Growth Fund.  This is further evidence of conditional localism. It illustrates how the 
scope for leadership was constrained as ‘place-based’ strategies had to be moulded to ‘fit’ 
with central government requirements. The possibility arises however that this degree of 
permissibility may be acceptable to some LEPs. To conform within bounds might mean 
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that leadership could be exercised; that is, the LEPs as sub-national governance structures 
have scope to devise strategy and undertake most of the action to meet their place-based 
objectives. 
 
The analysis raises serious issues about the extent of the capacity for leadership in LEPs and 
the extent to which these sub-national constellations of actors can take decisions on strategy 
and action that reflect place-based priorities. If it is deemed that the UK system of 
governance represents conditional localism (see table 2), the inference is that the leadership 
capacity of LEPs will be weak. In general terms, the analysis has shown that there are many 
subtle ways in which central government controls the scope for leadership in sub-national 
governance structures, which lurk behind the façade of enhanced freedoms, flexibilities and 
discretion emblematic of localism policy discourse. Yet, the acceptability of these controlling 
mechanisms would also appear crucial. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Invoking an understanding of leadership as the capacity of actors in sub-national governance 
structures to take decisions and action on place-based strategy, this paper has sought to 
advance scholarship pertaining to the governance and leadership of place-based development. 
This is in response to a recognition that the means by which leadership capacity, and the 
scope for action at sub-national scales, is facilitated or curbed by central government, is 
under-theorized and warrants further attention (BEER, 2014; SOTARAUTA, 2014; 
GIBNEY, 2014).  The investigation at the theoretical level led to an important analytical 
distinction between centralizing and localizing systems of governance.  
Research on the actual existing mechanisms utilized by the UK Government to control the 
activities of LEPs shows, despite a rhetoric of localism, how a centralizing government 
exercises significant – though often well camouflaged – control over sub-national patterns of 
leadership. More specifically, the following mechanisms were found: Legislation and formal 
agreements; the extent of fiscal autonomy; Funding; and Government Guidance. Control 
mechanisms such as these and the degree to which they are applied affect the scope for place-
based leadership in sub-national governance structures.  However, the introduction of the 
concepts of permissibility and acceptability enabled the enrichment of existing 
understandings of how the (vertical) system of governance affects leadership capacity in sub-
national (horizontal) governance structures. Indeed, some of the mechanisms represented a 
high degree of permissibility and would allow greater autonomy of leadership at the sub-
national level. This provides a new explanatory-analytical device – contributing to 
contemporary place-based leadership scholarship.   
Thus, in the nexus of the triad of leadership, system of governance, and centre-local relations, 
a new set of research questions emerges to include the consideration of the role of each of the 
control mechanisms in determining the scope for the exercise of leadership under each 
governance system. Namely, what effect do the types of controls that a higher authority 
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imposes on sub-national governance structures under different systems of governance have 
on the scope for leadership? The grounded theory approach taken here, which revealed the 
types of control mechanisms imposed by central government, enables the proposition to be 
made that, in theory, the scope for the exercise of leadership at sub-national level, defined as 
the power to make decisions and take action to address local priorities, is shaped by the 
controlling mechanisms utilized by central government under different vertical governance 
systems. The scope for leadership is also tempered by the degree of acceptability of the 
controlling mechanisms. Thus, the following propositions could be proffered:   
 Centralism –Controlling mechanisms include regulations and funding which is allocated 
to sub-national governance bodies which are legally mandated to execute central 
government programmes. This would equate to weakened sub-national leadership. 
However, where the sub-national governance structure is in accord ideologically and 
politically with central government, this could equate to strong leadership capacity at sub-
national scale.   
 New Centralism – where sub-national governance structures are tasked by national level 
legislation to produce strategies and take action to meet targets agreed with the central 
authority. Controls such as the amount of funding granted, and the relative lack of control 
over budgets, would circumscribe leadership capacity. However, if the constraints on 
action are acceptable, it can embody strong sub-national leadership.   
 Decentralization – legislation would not specify what the sub-national governance 
structures must do; resources, but not tax raising powers, are made available and 
government guidance given in relation to strategy and action. This affords considerable 
freedom of action. However, this is provided only if the outcomes that are delivered are 
what central government requires, with the result that there is weaker scope for local 
leadership.  
 Devolution – is the case where legal title to act is given and, since budgets are devolved 
and tax raising powers are afforded, fiscal autonomy is present and there is no national 
level guidance restricting the scope for action. The sub-national governance structure 
therefore has complete autonomy of action. However, a high degree of permissibility 
inherent in this system of governance could lead to inaction which would constitute weak 
leadership.  
It is clear that sub-national governance structures, fundamental to city and regional 
development efforts, exercise leadership with varying capacities to act. Place-based 
leadership, whether it is exercised by an individual or constellation of actors, provides the 
agency for action (ANSELL and GASH, 2008; LIDDLE, 2012; SOTARAUTA, 2014). The 
different mechanisms of control identified in this paper may be absent or present and 
influence the scope for leadership within different systems of governance. In the case of the 
UK, where central government is devolving different roles and responsibilities to sub-
national authorities, it remains to be seen the extent to which freedoms and flexibilities are 
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negotiable and will include the devolution of budgets, to increase the scope for sub-national 
leadership. Scotland had in early 2016 been granted fiscal autonomy; yet the power that this 
brings may be tempered by other regulatory controls which constrain the scope for 
leadership.  
 
In conclusion, it is a matter for further conceptual and empirical enquiry to investigate the 
intricate and multidimensional effects of the specific control mechanisms in isolation or as 
part of a more pervasive control mechanism apparatus. This research agenda would also 
involve the actually existing experience of the scope for leadership at sub-national scale in 
different jurisdictional contexts, including federal and non-federal systems.   
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NOTES 
                                                          
 
1 Conceptualised in terms of centralism and localism and which manifest of a vertical dimension of governance, 
encapsulated in the character of central-local relations. 
2 This encompasses regional, sub-regional and local government scales. 
3 BEER (2014) carried out interviews with leaders and stakeholders. 
4  See BARCA (2009); OECD (2009); TOMANEY (2010). 
5  As a social science methodology, grounded theory method (GT) involves the discovery of theory through the 
analysis of data (GLASER, 1992). It represents traditional, orthodox empiricism but, nonetheless, GT contains 
both inductive and deductive elements. It does not rule out the construction of hypotheses before an 
investigation; it does not rely wholly on empiricism. The task of a GT approach is to generate ideas, concepts 
and categories, from an analysis of data to discern patterns and relationships to derive hypotheses for 
subsequent testing (emphasis added). 
6 Generally MLG represents a conceptualization of the European Union where it is observed that decision 
making capacity resides in and involves a number of different levels. 
7 This would be represented in the diagram presented in figure 1 by an interconnection between the horizontal 
and vertical spheres of governance. This would indicate that national level institutions have a seat at the table in 
decision-making bodies at sub-national scale.  
8 This changes the focus on leadership by an individual leader and enables reference to leadership by a 
collective. 
9 The term actor is here taken to refer to those taking part in decision-making in institutional structures and who 
might also occasion action. As such these actors have agency and are involved in policy-making and 
implementation networks.   
10 Central Government could participate in the governance structure at sub-national level. This does not preclude 
it having influence or control over the sub-national level. See footnote 7. 
11 The lack of capability at the sub-national scale might necessitate conditionalities. 
12 Others might utilize the term ‘New Public Management’. This refers to the concept that ideas used in the 
private sector must be successful in the public sector; it represents a shift from bureaucratic administration to a 
business-like professional management. The term ‘New Centralism’ is utilized here since it relates to the debate 
on decentralization. New Centralism refers to the situation where central governments ‘impose tight centrally-
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defined controls on public policy and services, including those which are delivered on a decentralised basis’ 
(LEE, 2000, p96).   
13 Politically or ideologically; or from the point of view of pragmatism. 
14 In common parlance the difference is between ‘you agree with my objectives so you can do what I say you 
can do to meet objectives for place-based development in your sub-national territory’ (New Centralism). 
Conditional localism means ‘you can do what you want, provided you agree with my objectives and if you 
don’t, you won’t be enabled to do what you want to do to meet your objectives for place-based development in 
your sub-national territory  
15 Not all Local Authorities in LEP localities are represented on the Board.  
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